Carroll v. Superior Court of San Francisco [DISSENT] by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
3-12-1954
Carroll v. Superior Court of San Francisco
[DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Torts Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Carroll v. Superior Court of San Francisco [DISSENT]" (1954). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 277.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/277
874 MEMORANDUM CASES 
THE COURT.-This is a mandamus proceeding in which 
the judgments in consolidated actions reviewed on appeal in 
Pickens v. Johnson, ante, p. 399 [267 P.2d 801], are at-
tacked on one of the grounds urged on that appeal. Inas-
much as the appeal disposes of that issue, the petition for the 
writ is denied and the alternative writ discharged. (See 
California ToU Bridge Authority v. Durkee, 40 Cal.2d 341 
[253 P.2d 673] .) 
Dooling, J. pro tern. sat in place of the Chief Justice, who 
deemed himself disqualified. 
[42 C.2d 874; 267 P.2d 1037] 
[S. F. No. 18771. In Bank. Mar. 12, 1954.] 
' FRANCIS CARROLL, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR 
COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 
FRANCISCO, Respondent; DONALD E. PRESLEY, 
Real Party in Interest. 
PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior 
Court of the City and County of San Francisco from en-
forcing an order for inspection of photographs. Writ granted. 
Landels & Weigel and Stanley A. Weigel for Petitioner. 
No appearance for Respondent. 
Dan L. Garrett, Jr., for Real Party in Interest. 
SHENK, J.-The petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition to 
restrain the respondent court from enforcing its order for 
the inspection of certain photographs in his possession. An 
alternative writ was issued. 
The order was made in an action entitled Presley v. Pacific 
Greyhound Lines, now pending in the respondent court. The 
plaintiff therein seeks to recover damages allegedly suffered 
by him from injuries received while riding on the defend-
ant's bus and caused by defendant's alleged negligence in 
operating the bus. Before trial in that action the plaintiff 
moved under section 1000 of the Code of Civil Procedure for 
an order permitting him to inspect and copy photographs 
in the possession and control of defendant and its attorney, 
Francis Carroll, the present petitioner. 
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:Affidavits were filed in . behalf· of the respective parties. 
The affidavit on behalf of the plaintiff was made by his 
counsel. It avers that the defendant and its attorneys' have 
possession of photographs of the scene ofthe accident depict-
ing the "condition of the said Greyhound Bus following 
the said accident, .. skid marks, debris, the condition of the 
highway £ollowing said aecident and other material and 
relevant evidence as to the occurrence of said accident.'' An 
affidavit in opposition to the motion was also filed. !t states 
that the ·photographs were taken by the agents of defendant 
for the purpose of delivering them to its attorneys and 
were in fact taken and delivered to. the attorneys to :enable 
t4e:n:i: to prepare a defense to the action. It is insisted that 
the privilege of attorney and client attaches to the informa-
tion. c0ntained in the photographic evidence. 
The. court . granted the. motion and ordered the inspectiqn. 
T:Q.e . defendant and th~ · petitioner have refused to c0n1piy 
With the order and are threatened with punishment . for 
C:o:q.1;:empt. The petitio}1er seek$ to restr,aih the trial court 
from pr()<meding with the enforcement of its order by ·this 
appliei!tio11• fol' the writ of. prohibition. 
The qnestiong prege~ted.inthis .G"ase are substantially .the 
san1e as ,those involved in the co:n:i:panion case of Holm v~ 
SuiJeri()f' (]Qurt~ ante, P• 500 (267 .P.2d: 1025, 268 P~2d 722L 
this. day filed. It was thete held that where the right to .asse:rt 
the privilege is clear .the. bill of discovery cannot he,used ~o de-
feat it ;. thatwhere a communication ishetwreu corporate eTI1.' 
J>lo;yees 3.Ild . is embodied . in . photographic •.. evii!<:J.n~e . for re-
delivery .to a eor:po:rate ll,ttorne;y7 the privilege attaches if 
the photQg~~phs were crea:t~d as a. means of co~mull.i:eating 
info:rlllation to the attorney, and .that where the d?~inant 
purpo~e is the trftnsmission of Jnformation to • an attorn~y 
i:n his professional eapa~ity it is immaterial i;}l'llt there are 
other incidental purposes J§Ot entitl~d to the privilege. 
In the present case there is no conflict with the peti-
tioner's affidavit showing that the photographs were taken 
for the express purpose of being transmitted to the defend-
ant's attorneys to .be used in .the threatened litigation. The 
petition for the writ of prohibition reasserts such a purpose 
and neither the respondent court nor the real parties in 
interest· have answered it. The facts before the trial court 
required a determination that the transmittal of the photo-
graphs to the attorneys was for the purposes of the litigation 
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and that this was the dominant if not the sole purpose. To 
deny the privilege in such circumstances was an abuse of 
discretion. 
Let the peremptory writ issue as prayed. The alternative 
writ is discharged. 
Gibson, 0. J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment on the ground 
that petitioner's allegation that the photographs were taken 
for the express purpose of transmitting them to him is not 
disputed by either the respondent court or the real parties 
in interest. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I agree that the photographs would be privileged if taken 
for the purpose of transmittal to defendant's counsel for 
use in litigation, but as I pointed out in my dissent in Holm 
v. Sttperior Cmtrt, ante, p. 500 [267 P.2d 1025, 268 P.2d 722], 
the burden of proof on that issue rested upon defendant, the 
claimant of the privilege. 'l'he trial court was justified in con-
cluding, as it did, that that burden had not been sustained 
because it could disbelieve the affidavits supplied by defendant 
even though uncontradicted. ''A trial judge is not required to 
accept as true the sworn testimony of a witness, even in 
the absence of evidence directly contradicting it, and this 
rule applies to an affidavit.'' (Lohman v. Lohman, 29 Cal. 
2d 144, 149 [173 P.2d 657]; see, also, other cases cited in 
Holm v. Superior Court, supra.) The rule is especially ap-
plicable in this case since the affidavit is by one of defendant's 
attorneys, hardly in a position to be unbiased. The majority 
opinion, however, determines the credibility of the affidavit 
contrary to the trial court, thus usurping its power. 
I would therefore deny the writ. 
